The issue of developing complex secure systems is still a great challenge. We claim that in contrast to the well known bottom-up oriented approaches secure concurrent systems should be developed top-down starting with a formal top-level speci cation. A framework for developing secure systems is needed, which o ers means to specify security requirements adapted to the speci c demands of application areas. In addition, an appropriate security model is needed to formally describe the behavior and the security properties of systems. We will present a uniform framework which is appropriate to match security policies to application needs. Secure concurrent systems are modeled with two di erent levels of abstraction. The action model provides a sound and ne-grained basis to formalize security properties of the system. In order to ease system modeling we introduce the object security model by systematically coarsening the action model. In addition to our security model we will present a security requirement logic. Security policies tailored to the speci c requirements of applications may by speci ed with the formulas of the logic. The security requirement logic allows to specify di erent security policies such as access control and information ow policies in a uniform way, and allows to compare these policies.
Introduction
The issue of developing complex secure systems is still a great challenge. Ad hoc solutions which extend existing operating system services with additional security mechanisms and services to enforce security requirements are error prone and not satisfactory. We claim that in contrast to the well known bottom-up oriented approaches secure concurrent systems should be developed top-down starting with a formal top-level speci cation which contains the integrated speci cation of security properties. According to the top-down approach the systems are realized on several levels of abstraction by stepwise re ning and implementing the speci ed properties. An integrated approach enables to verify the enforcement of the properties on each level of abstraction. The paper will present a formal and uniform framework which o ers means to de ne formal top-level speci cations and, in addition, which o ers a security model for secure concurrent systems. Within the paper we will restrict our attention to the modeling of concurrent secure systems neglecting the e orts needed to realize the modeled systems in a physically distributed environment. The security requirements of a system specify the allowed or disallowed information ows between users, as well as, access restrictions for single users. Within our framework a security requirement logic has been developed which enables to specify security requirements tailored to application needs. The security requirement logic will be presented. To describe the behavior and the security properties of a concurrent system an appropriate security model is needed. The lesson learned from studying the well known models is that a security model for concurrent systems is required which enables to model access properties, as well as, information ow properties adapted to the needs of individual application systems. The model should be easy to understand and to use, nevertheless, it must be sound. To achieve these requirements we propose an object-based approach to design secure systems. A concurrent system can be viewed as a set of active and passive objects interacting by means of method calls. The objects are the protected entities which can be speci ed with ne-grained granularity. Objects are only accessible via well-formed operations comparable with well-formed transactions in the Clark-Wilson model (c.f. CW87]). An object-based setting provides an appropriate basis to determine ne-grained access rights. The active objects are the subjects of the system acting in behalf of human users. From the point of view of a user the object abstraction is an appropriate level of abstraction to determine access restrictions for users concerning protected objects, and to determine information ow restrictions between users. In order to formalize the behavior of the system we introduce the action model. An action model provides the formal basis needed to de ne the security properties of a system. Based on the action model a logic for specifying security requirements will be introduced. Security requirements are expressed by means of logic formulas. The formulas of the logic o er a powerful formalism to specify access control policies, as well as, information ow policies. Using the logic we can specify well known security policies in a uniform manner, for instance, the multi-level security policy BL75], or the Chinese Wall policy BN89], as well as, application speci c security policies. The model used in our approach may be characterized as information ow model with special support for data integrity based on a computation model supporting concurrency.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the action model and the object security model for secure concurrent systems and de ne basic security properties. The logic to specify security requirements is de ned in section 3. Some examples, for instance the speci cation of the multi-level security policy and of the Chinese Wall policy, demonstrate the expressiveness of the logic. Finally, we will introduce the ordering on policies which enables us to systematically compare security policies. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Models
In this section two levels of abstraction to model secure concurrent systems namely the action model and the object security model are presented. Within the framework of the models basic security properties can be formalized.
Action Model
A concurrent system is modeled as an abstract machine by an action model given in de nition 1.
De nition 1 Action Model: A concurrent system is modeled by a tuple AM = (V; ; A;?;S 0 ) with:
1. V is the set of state objects. 
2
The abstract machine modeled by an action model consists of a set of state objects V , for example variables, a set of atomic actions A de ning the computational steps of the machine, the set of states de ned by the set of values of the state objects, a state transition relation ? de ning the state transitions of the machine and a set of initial states S 0 . The execution of an action causes a state change. Each action a may contain a precondition, the so called enabling condition EN a , which must be true before the action may be executed. In addition, for each action two sets of state objects, the domain set D a and the range set R a are de ned. The state objects of the domain set may be read and the objects of the range set may be modi ed during the execution of the action. Starting with an initial state s 0 2 S 0 the system evolves by executing enabled atomic actions. The state transition relation selects non deterministically an executable action and performs the state change according to the de ned e ects of the action. The e ect of an action b executed within a computation A is given by a set of triples. Each triple stores a modi ed state object v, the state s 0 after the modi cation and the new value s 0 v] of object v. Now we are able to de ne the security properties of a system AM with respect to information ows between actions. The security properties describe the relationships between actions according to the abilities of an action to change the e ects of other actions, i.e. to in uence their e ects, and to observe the e ects of other actions.
In uence and Observation
We say that an action a in uences the e ects of an action b by means of a member v of the domain D b of b if there exists an information ow from action a to action b through object v and if this information ow may be passed on to other actions by executing b. The formal de nition is given in de nition 4. For shortening the de nition we rst introduce a function mask which formalizes the result of purging the e ects of an action from a given action sequence.
De nition 3 Masking e ects: Given a system AM and a special action a id with ef a ( A ; a id ) = ; for each computation Note: The evaluation of predicates in a state of a computation is de ned by the function !.
De nition 4 In uences: Given a system AM, the nite pre x < A > of an accepted sequence < A 0 >2 A , If conditions C1, C3 and C4 hold action a directly in uences action b, because the value of the object x in the range of b depends on the execution of action a. Note that de nition 4 makes no assumptions about the properties of actions c lying between action a and b in the sequence < A >. These properties are covered implicitly by the de nition above. Consider, for instance, an action c which modi es the value of object v as well and which is unabled in < A >. That is, v contains di erent values after the execution of c in A and after the execution of the substitute action a id for c in A .
As the masking of a in A causes c to become unabled, action a is responsible for the di erent values of v and, therefore, in uences action b. This relationship between actions a; b and c is covered by de nition 4.
In addition to the in uence-property of an action we will de ne the property of an action to observe an in uence by means of objects in its range. That is, we will de ne the property of an action b to observe information ows from other actions by observing the values of objects in its own range. In contrast to the in uence-property the observationproperty requires that the in uenced action is still enabled after purging the in uencing action from the action sequence. That is, the in uence on the action is really mirrored by the the value of at least one object in the range of the action. 
Object Security Model
An action model completely describes the behavior of a system but its ne-grained level of description is cumbersome to handle. So we coarsen the model. This leads to the object security model of a system. Based on the detailed action model the de ned in uence and observation properties can easily be transmitted to the coarser model. That is, we will de ne the property of a user to in uence the e ects of activities performed by other users or to observe the e ects of activities performed by other users. The object security model is given in de nition 6. 
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A concurrent system is modeled by a set of objects K. For each object k 2 K a set of operations or methods E(k) may be de ned. The elements of E(k) may be invoked by other objects. The set of all operations of the system is given by O. An object may be active (process) or passive (monitor, module). The set of users is given by the set B.
Within the object model each user b is represented by a set of active objects u rep(b), the so called user representatives, which execute operations in behalf of the user.
Operations are invoked by users and executed by the associated user representatives. Each invocation creates an instance of the operation and the computational steps of the instance are de ned by a sequence of actions called action re nement of the operation invocation. An action re nement of an operation invocation starts with an action creating an instance of the operation and performing the input parameter association. The last element of the re nement sequence of an invocation is the termination action which associates the output parameters and deletes the operation instance. Concurrency between user activities is modeled by the interleaved execution of sequences of actions belonging to di erent action re nements of operations being called by the users'
representatives. An object is a protected entity and its methods determine the access rights which can be granted to users. The set of rights is given with R.
For each object k 2 K of the system a special state object called access control list is introduced. The access control list is used to protect objects from unauthorized access. The value of an access control list acl k in a given state s of the system is given by s acl k ].
The value of acl k may change dynamically according to changing access restrictions concerning object k. At a given time a user may perform di erent tasks within the system and each task may require special access rights. We introduce the notion of a role to abstractly describe the task of a user (for instance the administrator role or the statistic role for users performing statistical analysis). The set of roles is given with RL and the mapping rl b associates with each user a set of roles. For each role of a user there must exist a user representative acting in behalf of the user in the speci c role. This relationship is expressed by the mapping rl k . The access control list of an object describes, for example, the allowed access for users or for roles.
The object security model enables to model ne-grained protected entities (the objects of set K) adapted to the level of granularity the system being modeled requires. The operations of the set O de ne well-formed transactions, i.e. access rights for well-formed operations can be modeled. The role mechanism enables to grant a user di erent sets of access rights depending on his speci c task within the system.
Example 1:
We will model a simple message transport system with the object security model, but neglecting the action parts. The system consists of an object buffer which bu ers messages and three user representatives sending and receiving messages in behalf of two users U 1 and U 2 . send and receive are the methods of the object buffer. Messages are stored in the state object queue.
Security requirements: Permission to access the operation send should be granted to users performing tasks in the role SENDER and to the user U 1 . Permission to access the operation receive should only be granted to users working within the role RECEIVER. In addition, user U 2 may not invoke the method receive. A system enforcing these requirements can be modeled as follows:
The set of users is given by B = fU 1 ; U 2 g, and RL = fSENDER;RECEIV ERg de nes the set of roles. 
In uences and Observations between Users
The in uence and observation properties of actions will be re-de ned in the context of the object security model, i.e. we will de ne information ows between users.
De nition 7 In uences between users: Given a system MS, the nite pre x < A > of an accepted sequence < A 0 >2 A , s 0 <A> ?! s r with s 0 2 S 0 and the associated computation A , two user representatives ur 1 ; ur 2 2 K 0 , two operations op 1 ; op 2 2 O, a state object v 2 V , and a state s l 2 A . We say, there exists an in uence between user representatives ur 1 and ur 2 with respect to operations op 1 and op 2 in a given computation if the action re nement of an invocation inst op 1 of operation op 1 invoked by ur 1 contains an action which in uences an action contained in the action re nement of an invocation inst op 2 of operation op 2 invoked by ur 2 . As user representatives act in behalf of users an information ow between those users is established.
The in uence property de ned in 7 is a generalization of the non-interference property of Goguen and Meseguer GM82], because our model describes concurrent systems as well. Moreover, based on the action model the internal actions of the systems and their e ects can be modeled and, therefore, the properties of these actions with respect to in uences and observations can be determined. This allows us in contrast to GM82] to model systems which create classi ed information caused by the execution of such internal actions.
Example 2:
Consider again the message transport system given in example 1. Let < A1 > be a sequence of actions which contains the execution of the actions of the user representatives sender 1 and sender 2 to enqueue new messages in the state object queue, as well as, the actions of the user representative receiver to dequeue a message from queue. The actions of the sender 1 have been executed prior to the actions of the sender 2 and of the receiver. !(inf k (0; sender 1 ; receiver; send; receive;queue);s r ) = true; !(inf k (0; sender 1 ; sender 2 ; send; send; queue); s r ) = true: That is, the execution of an invocation of operation send invoked by sender 1 in uences the execution of invocations receive and send invoked by receiver and sender 2 , respectively.
N
To be able to distinguish between information ows which can be encapsulated and hidden within an operation and those which are observable outside of an operation we translate the property of observability to the object security model.
De nition 8 Observations between users:
Given the assumptions of de nition 7. User representative ur 2 observes user representative ur 1 in the sequence s l ; : : :; s r of A by means of the state object v and operations op 2 The activity of a user representative ur 1 is observable by a representative ur 2 if the value of an output parameter of at least one operation instance executed by ur 2 depends on the e ects of the execution of at least one operation instance executed by ur 1 .
Example 3:
Given the sequence of actions < A1 > as described in example 2. Let y be the output parameter of operation receive and let out(send) = ;. Security requirements (cont.): In addition to the security requirements given in example 1 concerning the access restrictions of the system we require that there may not exist an observable information ow between the two senders of the system. The following two predicates hold:
(1) !(obs k (0; receiver; sender 1 ; receive; send; y); s r ) = true (2) 8v 2 V : !(obs k (0; sender 2 ; sender 1 ; send; send; v); s r ) = false Predicate (1) is true in computation A1 , because the execution of the send operation is observable by executing the receive operation. Predicate (2) is false, because the send operation does not specify any output parameters, and, therefore, no observable in uences may occur. That is, the in uence of sender 1 on sender 2 according to the in uence property inf k stated in example 2 is encapsulated within operation send and is therefore not observable by user U 2 associated with the user representative sender 2 . User U 2 may not observe any activity of user U 1 by executing the operation send in computation A1 . This non-observability property holds for each computation and the system enforces the security requirement stated above.
N
The de nitions introduced describe the semantics of in uences and observations between users of a system in a universal way. We are free to chose an appropriate speci cation and implementation language to design secure systems. We just have to de ne an action semantics for the selected languages. The security requirements of a system { the security policy { must be stated in terms of the allowed or disallowed in uences and observations between the subjects of the system, as well as, in terms of the permitted accesses to system objects. In the next section we will introduce the logic formulas used to specify security policies.
The semantics of the formulas are formalized based on the in uence and observe properties of the underlying models. Within our framework systems and security policies are uniformly modeled and speci ed. The uniform formalism enables the veri cation of security properties with respect to speci ed requirements. Furthermore, within the universal framework it is possible to compare and evaluate security policies.
Security Requirements
To specify disallowed in uences and observations between users we will de ne conditional non-in uencing requirements and conditional non-observing requirements. Disallowed and allowed accesses are speci ed by access restriction requirements. De nition 9 introduces the logic to specify security requirements.
De nition 9 Security requirement logic: Given an object security model MS. The set of state objects V of MS, a set of predicate symbols PS with fcninf;cnobs;acc;ing PS, and the temporal operator 2 form the syntactic basis of the logic.
For each computation of MS let < de ne the linear ordering on states of the sequence . Let TFO be the set of all formulas over the syntactic basis. ! : TFO ?! ftrue;falseg de nes the semantics of formulas in a computation of MS. Given Cond 2 TFO, ur 1 ; ur 2 2 K 0 ; op 1 ; op 2 2 O; and k 2 K the mapping ! is de ned as follows:
1. Given a formula P 2 TFO : !(2P; s) = true : () 8 s 0 2 : s 0 s : !(P; s 0 ) = true. 5. !(in(ur; op); s) = true : () there exists an invocation inst op of operation op invoked by representative ur and the last element of the action re nement sequence (inst op) has not been executed in the pre x 0 = s 0 ; : : :; s of . 2
The temporal operator 2 expresses the usual 'henceforth' semantics. A conditional non-in uencing requirement between two user representatives ur 1 and ur 2 with respect to two operations requires that as long as the condition Cond within the requirement speci cation holds there may not occur an in uence from ur 1 on ur 2 by executing the speci ed operations. The meaning of a conditional non-observing requirement can be stated in an analogues way. An access restriction requirement concerning a user representative, an object and an operation exported by the object requires that the representative may not execute the speci ed operation if the condition Cond within the requirement does not hold. With the predicate in we are able to express control conditions. This is useful if we want to restrict, for instance, granted access rights to be used only within well-de ned execution domains (see example below). The conditional predicates o er a powerful formalism to specify security requirements tailored to the individual requirements of applications. With the access restriction predicates access control policies may be speci ed. Dynamically changing access rights may be expressed by specifying appropriate conditions within the predicates, for example, with conditions concerning the value of the access control list of the object being protected. Fine-grained information ow restrictions may be speci ed by using the cninf and cnobs predicates.
Example 4:
1. Given the ordered set of labels L = funclassified;confidential;secret;top secretg and the labeling function l : K 0 ?! L.
The formula:
8op;op 0 2 O 2cninf(ur 1 ; ur 2 ; op; op 0 ; (l(ur 1 ) > l(ur 2 )) requires that there may not exist an in uence from ur 1 on ur 2 if the classi cation of ur 1 is greater than the classi cation of ur 2 . If we specify such a requirement for all user representatives and for all operations we will obtain the requirements of the multi-level security policy of the Bell LaPadula model BL75]. 2. Replacing the non-in uencing formula given above with the non-observing formula: 8op;op 0 2 O 2cnobs(ur 2 ; ur 1 ; op; op 0 ; (l(ur 2 ) < l(ur 1 )) weakens the multi-level security requirements by just disallowing observable information ows from higher to lower levels. This speci cation still covers the intended information ow requirements but is less restrictive than the original multi-level security policy.
3. The formula: 2acc(ur; op; k; (ass u(ur); fopg) 2 acl k^i n(ur; op 0 )) speci es that user representative ur is permitted to access operation op of k if its associated user ass u(ur) is contained in the access control list of k and if the access to op is performed within the execution of operation op 0 , in(ur; op 0 ). That is, the right to access op is restricted to a speci ed execution context.
N
The examples demonstrate the expressiveness of the logic formulas. Requirements to restrict an allowed access to certain execution domains or to restrict the access by other conditions can not be expressed by the formalism of access control matrix approaches. The non-observability requirement of the example shows that multi-level security requirements can be speci ed in a less restrictive way, i.e. requirements are speci ed which are not expressible by the known formalisms. We are now able to specify security policies for a system.
Security Policies
De nition 10 Security policy: Given a system MS. A security policy P for MS is a formula of the security requirement logic de ned by a conjunction of one initial formula, of non-in uencing, non-observing, and of access restriction formulas. An initial formula P 0 speci es the allowed and disallowed accesses in the initial states s 0 2 S 0 .
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The security of a system is a measure of the system's ability to enforce a security policy P. A computation of the system is called secure with respect to P, if formula P holds in each state of the computation. The system S is called secure with respect to P if the formula P holds in each computation of S. P 0 is the initial formula of P MTS . The access restrictions permit the accesses to object buffer according to the informally stated restrictions in example 1. The policy speci es that user U2 is not allowed to observe the activities of user U 1 . In example 3 we have already argued that this non-observability property holds for each computation of the system. The system is secure with respect to policy P MTS .
N Example 6:
We will specify the Brewer and Nash BN89] Chinese Wall security policy with the formalism of the security requirement logic. According to the Chinese Wall model the objects of the system are grouped together in company data sets containing objects concerning the same company and in con ict of interest classes containing company data sets whose companies are in competition. The labeling functions x and y specify for each object the con ict of interest class and the company data set, respectively. Public available information is labeled with the special company data set y 0 . We introduce the special state object N to store the access history of the system. N is a boolean matrix with N(k; ur) = true if user representative ur has accessed object k. Now we are prepared to specify the policy.
In the initial states of the system all users are permitted to access any object, i.e. the initial formula is given with P 0 = true.
For each passive object k 2 K and for all operations op 2 E(k) we specify access restriction formulas: That is, access is only permitted for ur if k is in the same data set as an object k 0 already accessed by ur or if k belongs to a completely di erent con ict of interest class. The information ow restrictions of the Chinese Wall policy are speci ed by conditional non-in uencing formulas for each user representative ur and for each pair of passive objects k and k 0 :
2 cninf(ur; ur; k:read; k 0 :write; y(k) 6 = y(k 0 )^y(k) 6 = y 0 )
That is, write access to object k 0 (denoted by k'.write) is not permitted if there does exist any object k which has already been read by ur and which is a member of a di erent company data set and which does not contain public informations. With the speci ed formulas the Chinese Wall policy is given. N Given a system modeled by the object security model. Di erent policies may be stated for the system. The formal basis presented permits to de ne a partial dominance ordering on these policies. We say, a policy P1 dominates a policy P2 if P1 is at least as restrictive as P2, i.e. information ows which are not allowed according to policy P2 are not allowed according to P1, too, and each disallowed access in policy P2 is disallowed in P1 as well. Consider for instance example 4. Replacing the cninf requirements with cnobs requirements now permits information ows which are not allowed with respect to the cninf speci cation. The policy consisting of the cninf formulas dominates the policy consisting of the cnobs formulas.
The formalism provides an appropriate basis for comparing security requirements and thus for strengthening or weakening the requirements systematically by adding or removing information ow or access restrictions or by strengthening or weakening the conditions within the requirement formulas.
Conclusion
We have presented a uniform framework to model secure concurrent systems and to specify security requirements. The action model provides the sound basis needed to formalize security properties of the modeled system. Based on an action model we introduced our object security model. With the formalism of the object security model ne-grained protected entities, together with access rights for well-formed operations, and application speci c user roles de ning protection domains for users can easily be modeled. The object security model models concurrent systems with integrity and con dentiality properties. Security requirements for secure distributed systems should be formally stated to enable the veri cation of the system's security properties with respect to speci ed requirements. The security requirement logic presented o ers a powerful formalism to express ne-grained information ow restrictions as well as access restrictions tailored to the individual needs of applications. We have demonstrated the expressiveness of the logic by specifying well-known security policies, and requirements which can not be expressed by the known formalisms. We are able to specify access control and information ow policies uniformly by using the formulas of the logic. This uniform speci cation framework o ers for the rst time the possibility to formally compare and evaluate security policies. The models together with the security requirement logic can be applied to each level of implementation during the software engineering process of developing systems. On each level an action semantics of the language (for instance speci cation language, or highlevel programming language) to be used to implement the system must be de ned and the formalism of the framework is usable to specify and verify security properties on the selected level of abstraction. To implement speci ed security policies we have extended a high-level programming language with language concepts for access and information control. The development and implementation of appropriate operating system services based on a Mach3.0-Kernel to systematically realize secure systems in a physically distributed environment is still ongoing.
